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BAR BRIEFS
NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Baker vs. Building & Loan: Defendant was owner of mortgage on
property of P. The mortgage contained a covenant on part of P. to
keep buildings insured, and, in case said P. neglected or refused to
procure insurance or to deliver policies, the mortgagee was authorized
to procure insurance, the amount of premiums to become part of
mortgage debt. Assignment of rents was also taken as security by
defendant, and rents were being collected at time of trial. Plaintiff,
an insurance agent, paid premiums to his companies, less his commission,
taking assignment and subrogation agreement from insurance companies.
Demand was made on defendant for premiums, and subsequently suit
brought. Defendant's contentions were: 1. Standard mortgage
clause is a condition, not a covenant; 2. Plaintiff is not entitled to
subrogation by virtue of his laches; 3. Plaintiff not entitled to his 25%
commission. HELD: (following St. Paul Fire & Marine vs. Upton,
2 N. D. 229) An insurance agent, paying premiums on fire insurance
policies, as required by his contract with insurance companies, is subro-
gated to the rights of such insurance companies to collect the premiums,
including commissions. "The mortgage clause gave the mortgagee
immunity from certain forfeitures resulting under the policy from the
mortgagor's acts or omissions, and the mortgagee in terms agreed to
pay for this immunity the premiums in case of the mortgagor's default."
By delivery of the policies the imortgage clause Was brougli' home to
the defendant. Payment of premium means payment including com-
missions.
State ex rel Cleveringa vs. Sheriff: The validity of Chapter 157
of the Session Laws of 1933, entitled, "An act temporarily extending
the time in which redemption may be made from real, estate mortgage
foreclosure, and real estate execution sales," was in issue inthe case,
the issue arising upon an application for deed after foreclosure. HELD:
This is an emergency measure, temporary in character, expiring by its
owri terms, in two years, and is valid, under the police power, governing
mortgages executed and foreclosed during the period of its operation.
The legislature, however, can not assume a power forbidden by the
Constitution, Article 1 of which specifically prohibits the enactment of
any law "impairing the obligations of contracts" or "depriving a person
of property without due process." (See Sections 10, 13, 21, 24.) The
law of the land in existence at the time a contract is entered into forms
a part of the contract the same as if it were expressly incorporated
therein, and the obligations of the contract are determined by the law
in force at the time it is made. Laws now in force, inconsistent with
Chapter 157, Laws of 1933, are suspended for two years from February
21, 1933, but thereafter are in force and effect.
BAR ASSOCIATIONS
The Bar Bulletin of the Boston Bar Association discusses the
"why" of bar associations in the following:
"It is felt by some that membership in a bar association does not
result in any tangible return. It is probably true that membership does
not put cash into the pockets of a member. No one, however, can
measure the indirect benefits. What would happen to the lawyer if
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there were no organization devoted to solving his problems; no organiza-
tion to protect him against lowering the standards of admission, against
unethical and corrupt practices; no organization to represent him at
the bar of public opinion ? Is it too strong to say that destruction of
the legal profession might be the result? Even as it is, the lawyer, in
our opinion, is paying a heavy penalty because of the unwillingness of
so many of the profession to ally themselves with any bar association.
The public demands of bar associations more than they can give, because
our organizations are not supported by a majority of the bar. Whether
as a result of the depression or of some other cause, it is a fact that
bar associations from coast to coast have recently taken on new life.
The bar undoubtedly senses danger to its existence, and is striving to
protect itself from perils arising on every side."
To which we add, simply, that lawyers sense the danger to the
public much more quickly than they sense the danger to themselves,
and emphasize it by the following from the lips of the Hon. R. H.
Jackson, of the Alabama Bar:
"It takes no delirious vision to see that increasing numbers and
decreasing income may produce such competition as will overrule all
ethical restraints as it has in some lines and in some localities already.
To prevent such a condition transcends the mere right of self-defense,
it becomes a duty of public service. A collectively impotent and individ-
ually predatory bar would be a collapse of our professional tradition that
would stamp our generation as unworthy of its heritage. We are sum-
moned to trial by ordeal. We dare not fail."
PRACTICE OF LAW BY DEAD MEN
The California State Bar Journal has carried some interesting
discussions of late concerning the practice of law by dead men. In those
discussions we have read nothing that has caused us to change our view,
namely: that dead men can not and should not practice law.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession. Lawyers
do not sell goods or merchandise. They render personal, professional
service. Lawyers are not tradesmen. They are officers of the Court.
Even laymen know that a partnership is dissolved by the death of
one of the partners. Even laymen have discovered that it is unethical
to advertise or to solicit legal business. And laymen have obtained that
information from lawyers-and sometimes paid for the information
as advice.
Yet, though lawyers admit that it is neither ethical nor honest to
advertise or to solicit legal business, though they acknowledge that it is
unethical and dishonest whether the advertising or the solicitation be
directly or indirectly done, lawyers continue to permit the names of
deceased lawyers to appear on office doors, in telephone lists, and on
printed cards and letterheads. In fact, the names of dead men have
been known to re-appear on such printed matter after actual dissolution
of a partnership, and after the death of one of the partners.
How can we, as lawyers, then, expect to gain the confidence and
respect of laymen so long as we fail to practice what we preach, and
condone-by silence, at least-what we know to be wrong?
